Introduction
I am afraid that Immanuel Kant might have been mistaken. In his treatise on 'Perpetual Peace' he claimed that democracies are peaceful because citizens, 'if their consent is required in order to decide that war should be declared (. . .) would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war' (Kant, 1795, pp. 12-13 ). Yet the events of early 2003 are pointing in another direction: a number of democracies argued for war and attacked Iraq while the majority of their citizens had spoken out against military action (Gallup, 2003) . Such blatant discrepancy between government and citizens had not been foreseen in Kant's democratic peace plan. Thus, it is in need of explanation just like other anomalies and antinomies of the democratic peace proposition which indicate that democracies are not inherently peaceful (Müller, 2002a) . The famous 'double finding', that democracies do not wage war against each other but are intolerant and sometimes bellicose towards non-democracies, is still unexplained (see Müller and Wolff, Chapter 3 in this volume).
The reason is that traditionally democratic peace and democratic war have been analysed as separate phenomena. Certainly, Michael Doyle stressed that 'the very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts between liberal and nonliberal societies' (Doyle, 1983b, pp. 324-5) ; and Thomas Risse seconded this by pointing to the Janus face of democracies which do not fight among themselves, but 'are frequently involved in militarized disputes and war with authoritarian regimes' (Risse-Kappen, 1995a, p. 492) . However, the peacefulness of democratic dyads has been researched with a focus on either single aspect, with a clear emphasis on the former. But to understand the relationship between democracy on the one hand and peace and war on the other in a more comprehensive way, the two findings have to be theoretically integrated. The theory of democratic peace remains incomplete if it does not explain the wars fought by democracies; and an explanation of democratic wars is deficient as long as it does not address their pacifying long-term effects among democratic states. In this sense, I will argue that democratic peace and democratic war are mutually constitutive.
This hypothesis postulates a causal relationship between democratic community building, which draws on shared institutions, common values and security cooperation on the one hand, and democratic belligerence vis-à-vis non-democratic states on the other, which is based on non-recognition, exclusion and enmity. A process seems to be at work in international relations that works similarly to the mechanism Charles Tilly described as the state-building process in Europe, in which internal pacification was achieved through external war-making (Tilly, 1975a (Tilly, , 1985 . In the international system of today, an analogous mechanism is contributing to democratic community building and the renunciation of violence through coalition warfare and collective conflict management (Cederman, 2001) . That means that the very same reasons that generate peaceful relations among democracies also provoke democracies to wage war against non-democracies.
If this is the case, it might be helpful to draw on explanations of democratic peace in order to generate hypotheses about 'democratic war' and to explain the war-proneness of democracies vis-à-vis nondemocratic states. Throughout this, it is important not to focus on the reasons for the use of force alone but also to look at the way in which military means are applied. For Alexis de Tocqueville observed that changing reasons for war also lead to changing forms of warfare. Therefore, to explain democratic war, Tocqueville seems to be more helpful than Kant. While Kant focuses on the singular decision to go to war, Tocqueville takes the processes into account by which democracies engage in military action. By doing so, he is able to analyse some of the dynamics that create the democratic war puzzle. In his famous book on 'Democracy in America' he summarized his findings: 'There are two things which a democratic people will always find very difficult -to begin a war and to end it' (Tocqueville, 1840, p. 393) .
In what follows, I will focus on three reasons why democracies might be peaceful to each other, but abrasive or even bellicose towards nondemocracies. The first reason is an institutional one: domestic institutions
